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In this article we outline a theory of one kind of failure in information cycles: 
information “short circuits.” Information short circuits, as we define them, occur 
when safeguards to insure accurate and responsible transmission of information 
through information cycles are circumvented, often due to confirmation bias or 
moral panics. In instruction, we argue that such short circuits in the information 
cycle can be best engaged with at a “middle distance,” using cases that are not so 
distant from students’ lived experience that they seem irrelevant, but not so close 
that students can’t gain a critical distance, and we illustrate this framework with 
three such cases that concern moral panics about new technologies. Through this 
analysis, we hope to enrich a theoretical understanding of information literacy while 
also providing practical suggestions for application that will help learners critically 
assess sources while retaining a strong but realistic appreciation for procedural 
supports for epistemic responsibility, such as academic peer review and balanced 
journalism. 
 





Information literacy is a multidisciplinary area of study and is taught in a 
variety of ways in higher education, primarily through general education 
and academic library programming. The Association of College & 
Research Libraries (ACRL) has been a long-time shaper of how 
information literacy is taught in higher education in the United States, first 
with the Information Literacy Competency Standards for Higher Education 
(ACRL, 2000) and more recently the Framework for Information Literacy 
for Higher Education (ACRL, 2016). The original standards and the recent 
framework have guided how information literacy is taught to 
undergraduate students. In this article we will draw upon the ACRL 
 
* The authors would like to thank Michael Zimmer for his help acting as Editor for this 
article. In order to ensure that standards of blind peer review were maintained, given that 
the second author of this article is Editor-in-Chief of this journal, Dr. Zimmer graciously 
agreed to act as Editor by soliciting reviews, rendering editorial decisions on acceptance 
or rejection, providing editorial comments on revisions required, and deciding when 
revisions were sufficient to warrant acceptance and publication. 
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Framework and develop a new theorization of patterns of information 
transmission to enrich the Framework, presenting a novel theory of “short 
circuits” and demonstrating how it can be used in a variety of disciplines 
and contexts to teach undergraduate students how to navigate and 
comprehend the ever-changing information cycle; the way that information 
about an topic moves through different formats with different audiences 
over time, typically beginning with online information such as social media, 
moving to media coverage, and progressing to scholarly articles and 
books (Burkhardt et al., 2010).  
 
There are three frames in the ACRL Framework that align especially well 
when considering the information cycle. Authority is Constructed and 
Contextual focuses on the idea that information sources are a reflection of 
the author’s expertise in that area and emphasize that context of expertise 
and of use is an important consideration. Scholarship as Conversation 
acknowledges that the scholarly discourse is cyclical and changes over 
time and that not all questions have one single correct answer. This frame 
also encourages students to see themselves as contributors to 
conversations and their role in critiquing information. Information Creation 
as a Process recognizes that information differs according to its format in 
regard to creation, authorship, review process, and context of use while 
acknowledging that an expert researcher focuses more on content and 
context than on format (ACRL, 2016). 
 
Oftentimes when using the ACRL Framework to teach students about the 
information cycle it is common for instructors to focus on format and order 
of or time to creation, beginning with social media or news and then move 
on to formats such as scholarly articles and books. For example, 
Goodman (2015) introduced a lesson plan entitled “Tracing Information 
Over Time” which uses the information cycle to connect to the threshold 
concept Authority is Constructed and Contextual. Jenemann (2018) draws 
upon the framework’s Scholarship as Conversation to teach a lesson that 
asks students to place cards representing various formats of information 
such as Tweet, scholarly article, or book, in order of creation to 
demonstrate that information production occurs in a chronological order 
(Jenemann, 2018). Kirker (2018) uses an activity that asks students to 
present resources in chronological order by time to creation and maps it to 
the frame Information Creation as a Process, focusing on how the type of 
source indicates the type of information it conveys and how the time it 
takes to publish in various formats can impact scholarly conversation.  
 
Focusing on the orderly transfer of information in ideal circumstances is 
valuable in showcasing intended functions and effects of information 
practices but does not always teach students how to deal with information 
in real-world circumstances. Similarly, providing students with checklists 
like the CRAAP test (Blakeslee, 2004) that allow them to determine 
2




whether or not a resource is reliable can be useful to introduce simple 
concepts of information literacy, but doesn’t provide a view to why and 
how things go wrong in the information cycle. We can help students more 
successfully and more critically engage their information environment by 
not only looking at the normative process of how the creation and 
dissemination of information ought to work, but also looking at 
breakdowns and failures where inaccurate information is passed on, 
where partial information is passed on poorly, or when information 
changes over time, rendering a credible source inaccurate. Looking at 
failures in the information cycle can provide access to a broader and more 
critical understanding. Finding the right kind of cases, however, can be 
difficult. 
 
The 2016 United States presidential election, with the awareness it 
brought to news bias (Tsukayama, 2016; Isaac, 2016), the filter bubble 
(Pariser, 2011), and “fake news” provides a timely and accessible 
example of breakdowns in information cycles, as well as an urgency to 
make this a priority in information literacy education. However, as 
motivating as the example may be for educators, its use in instruction can 
be problematic: inflamed passions and ideological commitments may 
distract students from study of information transfer and divert attention to 
political positioning. There are similar problems with other prominent and 
otherwise excellent examples of failures in information cycles, like the anti-
vaxxer movement, 9/11 “Truthers,” and climate change denial. These 
cases may be too close to some students’ lived experience to be seen 
with clarity. Other cases, like Holocaust denial or racist justification of 
slavery, may be too distant—the majority of students may not be willing or 
able to see that the distorted interpretation and repetition of “data” and 
“evidence” at work in these cases is relevant to potential problems in their 
own information access and assessment. 
 
When the case is too close, some students feel attacked and conversation 
shuts down (Wang & Hickerson, 2016); when the case is too distant, 
failures in assessment and transmission of information look like problems 
for other people rather than an everyday issue that students must be 
aware of and guard against. We recommend use of “middle-distance” 
cases: close enough to the students’ views and lived experiences that 
they can see how information literacy is a problem for them personally, but 
not so close that students are unable to find enough critical distance from 
the issue itself to think about information transfer and construction of 
authority. 
 
We have developed a theory of “information short circuits” to describe 
breakdowns in the information cycle and have tested the practical value of 
this theory through instruction using “middle-distance” cases. In the 
following section we will offer a theoretical articulation of information short 
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circuits and describe how we have found excellent middle-distance cases 
at the intersection of moral panics, NEST (new and emerging science and 
technology), and technological determinism. Following this, we will present 
three examples which will serve as illustrations of the theory, but, we 
hope, may also be pedagogically useful to information literacy instruction 
in a variety of contexts. 
 
 
Information short circuits and the intersection of moral 
panics, NEST, and technological determinism 
 
There are a wide variety of possible errors in information cycles, ranging 
from innocuous and trivial (e.g. typos resulting in minor misquotes or 
misattributions) to wide-ranging in both scale and importance (e.g. 
purchase of Facebook advertisements that spread disinformation about 
political candidates). While a wide variety of such errors illustrate 
important points about the use and abuse of the information cycle, ideal 
cases for information literacy will effectively illustrate how the information 
cycle is supposed to preserve and transmit factual information through 
different formats, from research to reporting to public debate, by 
highlighting points of systematic human error in the transfer of information. 
We call these points of systematic human error “short circuits” in the 
information cycle. 
 
A literal short circuit is a dangerous accidental pathway for an electrical 
current that circumvents impeding functions that the circuit was designed 
to serve—for example, a short circuit might present a less resistant 
pathway for electrical current by routing around an LED or heating 
element. Information short circuits, as with all metaphors, only resemble 
their namesake in some ways. We mean “information short circuits” to 
refer to cases where appropriate and intended functions of critical 
assessment, contextualization, and fact-checking are left out of the 
information cycle through information transfer pathways that follow an 
unintended route of less resistance. Information short circuits easily go 
unnoticed, unlike literal short circuits, which often cause a noticeable 
failure of the function of the circuit: the light remains dark, or the heating 
element cold; an electrical fire may even break out! It is by contrast very 
easy to fail to notice that the information cycle’s function as a reliable 
transmitter of factual information has been circumvented, and that 
information has found a shorter (but unsafe) route around these intended 
impedances. 
 
In the examples we will present, the bridge that allows the short circuit that 
avoids these intended functions of the information cycle is provided 
through confirmation bias created by moral panics. We will define each of 
these terms and then provide examples of their connection. 
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Confirmation bias—when we seek to reinforce what we already believe 
and avoid the cognitive load and emotional risk of questioning our beliefs 
and assumptions—is a well- established epistemic problem (Nickerson, 
1998). Good research combats confirmation bias through the use of study 
design elements like control groups and statistical analysis, and norms of 
balanced reporting and responsible sourcing play a similar role in good 
journalism. However, even well-intended, well-trained, and responsible 
researchers and journalists sometimes fail to place these safeguards in 
the right spots to prevent short circuits, especially when they hold 
unjustified assumptions that appear to them so vital or so common-sense 
that they seem to be beyond questioning. This happens with particular 
frequency when large information landscapes are organized around and 
take place entirely within the context of a set of commonly shared 
assumptions, as is the case in the midst of a moral panic, which Cohen 
(1972) influentially defined as when “[a] condition, episode, person or 
group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal 
values and interests.” Classic examples of moral panics in the US context 
include the Salem witch trials, the War on Drugs, the “Satanic Panic” of 
the 1980s, or perennial fears that videogames cause violent behavior. 
 
Pedagogical use of information short circuits that take place in the context 
of current moral panics allows students to feel the pull of their confirmation 
bias and to experience the recognition that they have failed to critically 
assess their background assumptions. However, students will be able to 
experience this recognition if they cannot escape from the moral panic in 
order to assess its influence. Finding middle-distance cases is thus 
paramount to creating an authentic learning experience (Herrington & 
Herrington, 2005) of information short circuits. 
 
Ideal middle-distance cases can be found in cases where students are 
subject to moral panics that disengage their critical faculties through 
confirmation bias, but where their personal commitment to maintaining 
their beliefs is not so extreme that they will refuse to reconsider those 
assumptions. In our practical work with these cases in Philosophy of 
Digital Culture, an information literacy course at Old Dominion University 
(see Appendix for further details), we found that moral panics having to do 
with technology struck an excellent balance. These cases were part of the 
students’ everyday lived experience, were subject to moral panics, but 
were not beyond reassessment.  
 
Another reason why these cases are at a good “middle distance” for 
students is that they draw on our common tendency toward technological 
determinism in our thought about new and emerging science and 
technology (NEST) (Swierstra & Rip, 2007). Although technological 
determinism—the idea that the nature of a technology or medium fully 
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determines how people will act with or through it—is not taken seriously 
among contemporary philosophers of technology, technological 
determinism often lingers in writers’ background assumptions in public 
debate, and not infrequently even in academic research and debate 
(Swierstra & Rip, 2007). For example, we see a kind of technological 
determinism in much of the discussion of the Arab Spring, where Twitter 
and Facebook are given undue credit for pro-democratic activism and 
reform, failing to recognize years of organizing on the ground (Gerbaudo, 
2012; Comunello & Anzera, 2012). It is possible for the technology to be 
relevant without being determining or responsible, but public debate tends 
to attribute excessive responsibility to technology, especially in the context 
of moral panics. 
 
We will now turn to three examples of information short circuits that take 
place at this productive “middle-distant” intersection of moral panic, 
technological determinism, and NEST. The first proceeds from moral 
panic about selfies and a supposed rise in narcissism; the second from 
moral panic about cellphones and a supposed loss of empathy; the third 
from moral panic about social media and a supposed rise in unhappiness. 
 
 
Example one: Selfies cause mental illness 
 
In Philosophy of Digital Culture, there is a module on selfies that begins 
with students reading Senft & Baym’s journal article, “What does the selfie 
say?” (2015), which presents, in our terminology, a short circuit in the 
information cycle that takes place in the context of moral panics about 
selfies, following from a technological determinist interpretation of NEST. 
The authors call attention to how news reporting on selfies emphasizes 
narratives of narcissism, body image, teenage girls, and low self-esteem, 
despite significant problems in making these connections responsibly—
e.g. that narcissism is a psychological condition not clearly connected to 
selfies. These narratives provide a context where readers, reporters, and 
even researchers are subject to confirmation bias, where the view that 
frequent selfie-taking is unhealthy behavior based in low self-esteem is an 
unquestioned background assumption. In fact, empirical research 
suggests that high self-esteem, not low self-esteem, is more strongly 
associated with selfies and sexting (Hasinoff, 2015). 
 
As students complete the reading, they are asked to trace the citations in 
the article. In Philosophy of Digital Culture, this article is referred to and 
discussed throughout a weeks-long unit, and students revisit their original 
ideas or conclusions about the article. Senft and Baym (2015) analyze 
what they call a “media circularity” about “selfie addiction,” in which an 
Adweek article (Barakat, 2014) discusses a case brought to prominence 
through a Mirror article (Aldridge & Harden, 2014) and cites a Time article 
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(Grossman, 2014) to substantiate its claim that “selfie addiction” is a real 
disorder. The Time article is substantiated only by the same prior Mirror 
article and (supposedly) by an unpublished academic article in the field of 
business—that, however, does not contain the word “addict” or “addiction” 
(Houghton, Joinson, Caldwell, & Marder, 2013). This series of self-
reinforcing journalistic pieces, through their interconnections, create the 
mirage of a foundation in research. 
 
Having students look further into the sources mentioned by Senft and 
Baym (2015) shows them other problems in information cycles and 
construction of authority. The articles report on a young man who 
attempted suicide. He had been diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder and body dysmorphic disorder, which manifested in part in 
obsessive selfie-taking. The articles introduce technological determinism 
by indicting the technology rather than treating his behavior as a symptom 
of his diagnosed mental illness. The Mirror article states that “Danny is not 
some bizarre one-off case in a world where smartphone and social media 
is spiraling upwards” (Aldridge & Hardin, 2014, n.p.). Aldridge and Hardin 
go on to claim that “The top psychiatrist at the clinic where Danny was 
treated revealed addiction to taking selfies is becoming so widespread it is 
now is [sic] a recognised mental illness” (n.p.). Neither of the world-
standard classifications of mental illnesses, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders or the International Classification of Diseases, 
contain the word “selfie,” and all reporting we found about “selfie 
addiction” could be traced back to this particular psychiatrist, Dr. David 
Veale. 
 
Students are prompted to participate in a conversation about one 
particular quote that stood out as problematic. The Adweek article heavily 
depends on Veale’s comments in the Mirror article for scientific legitimacy, 
but also includes a claim not found there: “Veale said that since the rise of 
camera phones, two out of three of his patients suffer from Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder and compulsively take selfies” (Barakat, 2014, n.p.) 
This quote without further context presents what sounds like a troubling 
fact: two thirds of his patients have this disorder! Of course, we are not 
told what his practice is. If it is a practice that focuses on Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder, this number might be surprisingly low. 
 
The Adweek article provides no source for this quote, but a Google search 
finds numerous sources (the original source is unclear) that contain a 
slightly different quote from Veale: “Two out of three of all the patients who 
come to see me with Body Dysmorphic Disorder since the rise of camera 
phones have a compulsion to repeatedly take selfies” (emphasis added). 
This seems much less troubling: we might reasonably expect that many 
patients with Body Dysmorphic Disorder might have a compulsion to take 
selfies, given the nature of their mental illness. It’s also worth noting that 
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Adweek rearranged the quote not only to make the claim more dire, but 
also to support technological determinism. The fuller quote says, 
approximately, ‘66% of this group with BDD have symptoms involving 
selfies’, while the Adweek paraphrase seems to say, approximately, 
‘cellphones became common and now 66% of my patients have BDD’—a 
post hoc ergo propter hoc logical fallacy. 
 
The Adweek article also quotes Pamela Rutledge saying that “Selfies 
frequently trigger perceptions of self-indulgence or attention-seeking social 
dependence that raises the damned-if-you-do and damned-if-you-don’t 
specter of either narcissism or low self-esteem,” (2013, n.p.) but it isn’t 
noted that Rutledge is merely reporting on the social judgments that selfie-
takers are subjected to. The conclusions Rutledge (2013) actually draw 
are that selfies “allow us to play, to have fun and to poke at ourselves” and 
that while “there are some unfortunate uses of selfies . . . that doesn’t 
mean the act of taking a selfie is a bad thing” (n.p.). 
 
The Adweek headline, “Science Links Selfies to Narcissism, Addiction & 
Low Self Esteem,” suggests that the report is based on scientific research, 
however the only report mentioned in the article is a non-peer-reviewed 
discussion paper published in one author’s institutional repository 
(Houghton et al., 2013) that concluded that Facebook users can better 
maintain personal relationships by sharing photographs in great volume 
only with closer friends and family—a conclusion that has only a tenuous 
connection to the assertion of the article’s headline. All other sources are 
not research articles, leaving little grounding for the headline invocation of 
the authority of “science,” even putting aside the misinterpretations and 
mischaracterizations discussed above. Through these articles we see how 
a moral panic about NEST provides a context in which journalists and 
readers mistake reciprocally reinforcing confirmation bias for meaningful 
consensus, and in which confirmation bias allows selective reading, 
uneven reporting, and transformative and inaccurate paraphrasing. 
 
While in Philosophy of Digital Culture the Senft and Baym (2015) article is 
read and discussed in the context of a several-week-long investigation of 
moral panics and NEST. This case could also be presented as a stand-
alone example by having students reconstruct the information cycle. 
 
 
Example two: Screens make us bad at relating to people 
 
Our second example takes place amidst the moral panic about how the 
rising use of mobile phones allegedly leads to a loss of personal 
connection with others and a decline in relationship skills. Davis (2014) 
called attention to this case in her critique of Uhls et al. (2014) a study 
caught up in this moral panic, simplified and widely reported on by mass 
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media, and used in Turkle’s prominent and widely-reviewed (Penguin 
Random House, n.d.) book, Reclaiming Conversation (2015). 
 
Davis (2014) demonstrates that questionable experimental design led 
Uhls et al. (2014) to misreport results. Uhls et al. studied whether 
cellphone use affected preteen users’ ability to correctly interpret 
emotional cues through facial expressions. During a five-day summer 
camp, their experiment group did not use cellphones; the control group 
was allowed to use regularly use cell phones. Both groups were given 
empathy-perception tests both before and after their summer camps. Uhls 
et al. found that the experiment (no-cellphone) group saw a greater 
success rate in recognition of non-verbal emotional cues in comparison to 
their pre-experiment baseline and concluded that abstaining from 
cellphone use had increased subjects’ recognition of emotion cues. 
 
Davis (2014) points out, however, that the post-experiment testing results 
did not differ to a statistically significant degree between experiment and 
control groups. Instead, the pre- and post-testing differential in the control 
and experiment groups was primarily due to a significant variation in pre-
testing results, which took place under different social circumstances, 
introducing an ignored explanatory variable. Specifically: the control group 
took their pretest at school, before leaving for camp, and the experiment 
group took theirs upon arriving at camp. As Davis reasonably puts her 
critique, “I would argue that kids in a new environment, distracted by the 
excitement and nervousness of a week in the woods, would not score as 
well as those taking the test in a comfortable and familiar environment” 
(Davis, 2014, n.p.). 
 
How did this study pass peer review without having this methodological 
concern raised by reviewers? The results reported confirm existing bias 
connected to moral panics and narratives of disconnection concerning 
digital media use, and this could reasonably be expected to have lowered 
reviewers’ guard against failing to critically assess information and the way 
conclusions are drawn from that information. This tendency is also seen in 
the uncritical reporting on the study found in mainstream news outlets 
(e.g. Summers, 2014, Wolpert, 2014). 
 
This example could be used for teaching in different ways, depending on 
context. When working with students in a research-methods course, 
students could read the study and talk through what it demonstrates and 
how. Large-group discussion and/or individual small-stakes writing on the 
exercise could then reflect on what factors may have been at work in 
allowing this to pass through peer-review and editorial review without the 
authors, reviewers, or editor noting the apparent problem or deciding to 
take action on it. 
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In other contexts, such as during a library instruction session, students 
could be presented with the study and the critique, and then use Google in 
small groups to trace how this study influenced ongoing conversations and 
public debate about screen use—at the time of writing, a search for “Uhls,” 
“phones,” and “camp” results in retrieval of reporting from The LA Times, 
The Huffington Post, and Time in the first page of results. Adding other 
keywords, such as “children,” could help to get at different or more 
focused ways in which this article has influenced ongoing conversations. 
Students can compare how various kinds of media outlets used the study 
differently, and which were more or less responsible, and draw 
conclusions for themselves about their future approach to thinking and 
writing about topics subject to moral panics. 
 
Students can also use Google Scholar to search for scholarly work citing 
this study, and to trace distortions introduced into Scholarship as 
Conversation, but our final example may be better suited to this 
application, as it has been of broader influence within ongoing scholarship. 
 
 
Example Three: Social Media Makes Us Lonely and Sad 
 
Our last example relates to the moral panic about personal relationships 
online, specifically, the idea that online relationships aren’t real 
relationships, and that being social online rather than offline is making our 
lives worse. It is of special interest due to how influential the flawed study 
has been, not in popular press and public debate, but within further 
scholarship. 
 
Kross et al. (2013) published a study on Facebook and self-reported 
subjective well-being that was widely reported as demonstrating that 
increased social media use results in decreased happiness. The study 
required participants to reply to five text-messaged survey questions: (1) 
“How do you feel right now,” (2) “How worried are you right now,” (3) “How 
lonely do you feel right now,” (4) “How much have you used Facebook 
since the last time we asked,” and (5) “How much have you interacted with 
other people “directly” since the last time we asked?” These five questions 
were asked five times every day over a two-week period. 
 
These questions included two prompts for negative assessments (“How 
worried are you right now;” “How lonely do you feel right now?”) but no 
prompts for positive assessments (e.g. “How connected to others do you 
feel right now?”). This ensured that negative rather than positive 
assessments would result merely through the constrained metric. 
Furthermore, we would expect that if someone were asked only questions 
1–3 they would report more negative self-assessments, due to the well-
documented effect of psychological priming. To make this concrete, 
10




students are asked to consider how they would feel if they had to 
document how worried and lonely they felt five times a day for two weeks. 
If not for the ethical issues in conducting a study so transparently likely to 
cause psychological harm to participants, this would have been a way of 
introducing a control group. (No control group was included in the 
experiment design.) 
 
The negative categories of assessment and the priming of negative-toned 
questions could be expected to produce a baseline of negativity. This 
does not itself strongly call the study into question, since, even though it 
may skew assessments toward negativity, there still might be a statistically 
significant correlation over the two-week study between participants’ 
degree of negative self-assessment and amount of time spent on 
Facebook. To really invalidate the study’s conclusions, the study design 
would have to also prime participants to associate feelings of anxiety and 
loneliness with their frequency of Facebook use, or encourage participants 
to feel like there is something wrong or questionable about Facebook use. 
The study does exactly this through the remaining two questions. 
 
In question 4, participants are primed to associate feelings of anxiety and 
loneliness with frequency of Facebook use. Participants were not told why 
researchers asked about loneliness and also about Facebook use, but 
they are likely to think that these researchers are studying a connection 
between the two. Furthermore, based on our cultural assumptions and the 
moral panic about digital media, it is unlikely that study participants will 
think that the researchers are concerned that face-to-face interactions 
might be more likely to make us lonely and anxious. Given this cultural 
context, the hypothesis that this question projected to study participants, 
five times daily, is that Facebook use makes you lonely and anxious. 
 
In question 5, participants are encouraged to feel like there is something 
wrong or questionable about Facebook use by asking about “direct” 
communication, which was defined to participants as “face-to-face or 
phone interactions” (Kross et al. 2013). It is unclear that participants would 
have otherwise defined Facebook communication as not “direct,” or that 
participants would have thought about Facebook interactions as 
importantly distinct from telephonic or face-to-face interaction, especially 
as these often take place closely alongside one another in multimodal 
communications with the same person, sometimes through the same 
device. This definition primes participants to see Facebook interaction as 
separate and unequal through the use of the word “directly,” even though 
placed in scare-quotes. This poisons the well, implicitly communicating to 
study participants that the view that Facebook communication may itself 
be “direct,” or may not be distinct from other forms of interaction, is 
unacceptable to the researchers and falls outside of the constraints within 
which participants are to analyze and report their experiences. 
11
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The study does not account for the impact of having asked participants 
these push-poll questions 600 times over two weeks, or how the existing 
moral panic and media hype cycle, as well as our technologically 
deterministic suspicions about human impacts of NEST, may have 
produced the results reported in part or in whole. All these critiques, 
however, do not mean that it is false that Facebook use is correlated with 
feelings of anxiety and loneliness. They mean only that, even if the reality 
is precisely the opposite of the conclusion drawn from this study, this 
experiment design could still be expected to produce these results. 
 
A glance at the titles of mass-media articles that mention the study shows 
uncritical reporting of these deeply questionable results, and a sample of 
the first 20 results of the 1158 citations of the Kross et al. study identified 
by Google Scholar at time of writing, including use in both scholarly 
articles and in college textbooks, shows that academic use of this study is 
often similarly uncritical, showing how questionable research is 
propagated in academic research, instruction, and journalistic reporting 
when results accord with moral panics, NEST, and technological 
determinism (Bell, 2013; Konnikova, 2013). 
 
Given this study’s social impact through journalistic reporting (Plos One, 
n.d.), and given the relevance of this moral panic to the lives of nearly 
anyone entering our classrooms and learning environments, this example 
provides an excellent basis for the exercises about influence in public 
debate presented above with the second case. Students could conduct 
Google searches in small groups to track and compare different kinds of 
reporting from different kinds of sources, and to see how far the influence 
of the study extends, then reflecting on what they take away from this 
case for their own future thought, reading, and reasoning. 
 
This example is particularly well-suited to tracing influence through 
Scholarship as Conversation, since it has been so widely cited in further 
scholarship. Students could trace the influence of Kross et al. in 
Scholarship as Conversation, and look at how the study is addressed, to 
what degree it is questioned, and to what degree the authority of peer-
reviewed publication is allowed, on its own, to prefigure future research or 
justify otherwise questionable claims. 
 
With this example, students can also consider confirmation bias, moral 
panics, technological determinism, and the trustworthiness of peer review. 
For example, if students have not read the article before class, they could 
be split into A and B groups, with one group given the study’s questions to 
answer, and the other being given alternate, less biased questions (e.g. 
(1) “How do you feel right now,” (2) “How connected to others do you feel 
right now,” (3) “How disconnected from others do you feel right now,” (4) 
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“How much have you interacted with others through digital technology 
since the last time we asked,” and (5) “How much have you interacted with 
others without digital technology since the last time we asked?”). Students 
could then be briefed on priming and some of the other problems 
discussed above, A and B groups could compare their experience 
answering the questions, and then the study itself could be introduced, 
described, and critiqued.  
 
A class could group themselves based on how many times a day they look 
at Facebook and discuss their critique of the article and whether or not 
they believe that the information presented in the study is relevant or true 
in their own day to day experiences. After some discussion, groups will be 
given a mainstream media online article that simplistically interprets the 
Kross et al. study to discuss. They will be asked to compare the 
information presented in the mainstream media article to the Kross et al. 
study.  
 
Lastly, groups could be challenged to search using Google to find a 
mainstream media article that questions or rebuts the Kross et al. study, 
which will be challenging but not impossible. This will give students the 
opportunity to consider algorithmic bias based on their findings. Since the 
students are split into groups based on their reported use of Facebook, 
they could be prompted to discuss how their own biases may have 
influenced the way that they searched for a rebuttal article, and even what 
may have shown up in their Google search results. In more heavily 
methods-centered and social-scientific settings, this case offers an 
excellent opportunity for students to think about how prejudices— 
technologically deterministic in this case, but often having to do with race 
or gender—can enter into the scholarly record through bias, and then can 
come to frame research and debate in Scholarship as Conversation for 
another entire generation of scholars, or longer. Students can reflect on 
how Scholarship as Conversation and the information cycle can be used 
to fix short circuits like this one, after they have entered into and become 
ensconced within the scholarly record as “settled knowledge,” and what 
positive role they could personally play either as researchers or simply as 





Examples of information short circuits can effectively demonstrate how the 
information cycle is intended to function, and how breakdowns in that 
cycle occur and are propagated. They also demonstrate that, to be fully 
responsible, a reader must critically assess sources, and must even trace 
them back throughout the information cycle, and critically assess their 
basis in research. The burden of training students how to do this is far too 
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much for one-shot library instruction to bear—too much even for a 
semester-long information literacy course. We can still contribute to this 
effort by instruction in the information cycle and Scholarship as 
Conversation, including, as we have done in these examples, through the 
use of critique and social-critical research from the humanities; areas such 
as philosophy, women’s studies, and science and technology studies. 
 
In this process, and across different courses and in library instruction, it is 
not enough to focus on developing critical, well-informed, information 
literate skills in assessment and evaluation of information. Even the most 
responsible readers can’t be expected to dig down to original research on 
every topic they have to be informed on and make decisions about, and 
even if they tried, closed-access publication often renders this impossible. 
We need trusted systems that can bear some of the cognitive load—
systems like journalistic standards and peer review—and corrective 
systems for those trusted systems, like open access publication, open 
data sets, and critique from the humanities. Consideration of information 
short circuits demonstrates that epistemic responsibility cannot be laid at 
the foot of the reader but is a matter of social and institutional 
responsibility as well. The “take away” from information literacy instruction 
should not be that individual readers are responsible for critically 
assessing information, but that it is our collective responsibility to establish 
and maintain best practices at every stage of the information cycle to 
reduce or eliminate distortions and short-circuits.  
 
In our instruction we must also take care in critiquing these trusted 
systems, lest we inadvertently encourage students to give up on trusting 
experts altogether, especially in our age of anti-science conspiracy 
theories. Simply insisting on the authority of experts or on the “gold 
standard” of peer review is no solution, though: uncritical and idealized 
faith is brittle. Looking at when and how these systems fail can provide a 
critical and nuanced understanding that recognizes why these are good 
systems, deserving of trust, even though they are imperfect, and can even 
provide insight on when we may need to switch over from a trusting 
attitude to critical assessment of claims and sources.  
 
Using example that present breakdowns in the information cycle, and 
combining those case studies with creative lesson planning that allows 
students to experience and relate to both the content and the experience 
of the cycle can help students grasp the concept that research and is an 
iterative, ongoing, and cyclical process and that the information cycle is 
not perfect or linear. Students are used to a world in which finding and 
sharing information is easy, but looking at and examining the information 
cycle as a whole and incorporating it into their own current practices and 
future professional roles in creating and sharing information is the next, 
more crucial step that we can teach students to take through looking at 
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information critically and being able to identify the processes by which it 





As a research article, the primary concern of this article is to present the 
theory of information short circuits, and the secondary concern is to 
promote this approach to information literacy instruction. To this end, this 
article has focused on theory and on a variety of applications and has 
provided only scant detail about the course in which we have personally 
used these cases. This specific context may however be of use or interest 
to some readers. 
 
Philosophy of Digital Culture at Old Dominion University is a course 
offered in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies. At the time 
of initial writing of this article, it was one of only seven courses offered 
across the university that satisfied the information literacy general 
education requirement and was open to students of any major. For this 
reason, students enrolled in the course came from a wide variety of 
majors, although majors in the humanities and social sciences were most 
common, with majors in education, the natural sciences, and health 
sciences being common as well. Students in engineering majors and in 
political science were rarely or never enrolled in the course, as these 
majors contain a required major-specific information literacy course. The 
course was in demand and always reached its 35-student per section 
capacity. Of these, no more than one or two students would be Philosophy 
majors. 
 
The course was offered at the 200-level because the information literacy 
requirement is meant to be taken after the required 100-level composition 
course and before the 300- or 400-level required in-major writing-intensive 
course. This sequence, however, is not enforced by any formal 
mechanism, and the course always contained students ranging from first-
semester students to graduating seniors. 
 
Old Dominion University is an MSI (Minority Serving Institution) with 26% 
African American students, 8% Hispanic students, and 5% Asian students. 
Student demographics tend older than many American universities, with 
many military veteran and degree completion students. 45% of students 
are 26 or older, 52% of students are parents or guardians, and 82% work 
20 hours per week or more. 
 
Over the course, students completed two short research papers that 
required use of both academic and general-audience sources, with all 
additional assignments either supporting and contributing to those papers 
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or reflecting upon them. Those assignments were (1) Proposal abstract, 
(2) Information Needs Assessment, (3) Reflection on reverse-engineered 
research questions, (4) Annotated bibliography, (5) First paper, (6) 
Second paper plan, (7) Self-assessment of research, writing, reviewing, 
revising, and editing habits, (8) Reflection on scholarly values, (9) 
Reflection on course content, (10) Reflection on course process training, 
and (11) Second paper. Through these assignments, students were 
engaged in practical training relevant to information literacy general 
education competency requirements. 
 
The course readings and discussion topics were also largely focused on 
information literacy, so that students addressed information literacy 
requirements by learning information literate skills while conducting 
research-based writing on topics within information literacy. The first paper 
was required to take one of the readings from the first five course modules 
as its primary theoretical basis; the second paper was required to take one 
of the readings from the second five course modules as its primary 
theoretical basis. The course modules were (1) Digital nativity, (2) Search 
engine culture, (3) The personalized web, (4) Political economies of digital 
culture, (5) Intellectual property rights, (6) Friendship and identity on 
Facebook, (7) Selfies, (8) Race online, (9) Augmented reality, and (10) 
Information warfare. 
 
Student Learning Objectives stated that  
 
[b]y the end of the course, students will be able to: 
1. Determine the nature and extent of the information needed for 
research; 
2. Access information effectively and efficiently; 
3. Critically evaluate information and information sources, such as 
library databases, collections, or websites appropriate to their 
own fields of research; 
4. Use information effectively to accomplish a specific purpose and 
to complete a written research project; 
5. Understand the economic, social, legal, and ethical issues 
surrounding the access and use of information; 
6. Use information ethically and lawfully 
 
Our examples of information short circuits have been presented as taking 
place at a productive “middle-distant” intersection of moral panic, 
technological determinism, and NEST. In the context of the course, 
discussions of moral panics, technological determinism, and their 
connection to NEST were explicitly addressed, at length, early in the 
course. This is due to the nature of the course as a philosophy course, 
and its instructor, a philosopher of technology, and we do not think this is 
necessary for the effective use of these cases. 
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As noted in the main body of this paper, the Senft & Baym paper was an 
assigned reading, in module 7, on selfies. Students could also use the 
Senft & Baym paper as a primary basis or passim in their second papers, 
and have done so. The specifics of the use of the other two articles in the 
course are not given in the main body of this paper since they were deeply 
embedded within course conversations that develop related themes over 
many weeks, using numerous readings. These details are provided here 
in case they should be of interest to the reader, although the particulars of 
their use in this course are by no means requisite to effective use of our 
examples. 
 
The Uhls et al. article was introduced in class to illustrate confirmation bias 
in study design and peer-review processes, within the already-established 
context of moral panics, technological determinism, and NEST. Students 
did not read the article in advance, but it was put up in the projector in 
class, and sections of it were read together. Students were led in a 
discussion of concerns about the study, and, in the context of previous 
discussion of confirmation bias and moral panics, regularly succeeded in 
independently identifying the concerning fact that the difference between 
the experiment and control groups relates to pre-testing rather than post-
testing. 
 
The Kross et al. article was introduced in class to demonstrate how 
distortions in the information cycle can introduce false information in the 
scholarly record, which citational practices and academic Construction of 
Authority can easily uncritically promote and promulgate, especially in the 
already-established context of moral panics, technological determinism, 
and NEST. This helped to establish an ongoing argument through the 
course that Scholarship as Conversation needs to be a normative, critical 
process in order to correct distortions of bias, racism, and sexism within 
the scholarly record. 
 
As with Uhls et al., the Kross et al. article was put up on the projector in 
class, and talked through in interactive lecture. Students were invited to 
consider their feelings if they were asked “are you lonely” five times a day 
for two weeks, and then led in a student-centered discussion about biases 
in the study design. Google Scholar was then used to look at a sampling 
of articles citing the flawed study in an interactive discussion about 
uncritical reception of information in Scholarship as Conversation that is 
distorted by confirmation bias, moral panics, technological determinism, 
and NEST. 
 
The overall, course-length case that was made using these examples was 
that peer review and science reporting are important parts of the 
information cycle, and are important to our society, and that it is vital to the 
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proper functioning of these processes that we take seriously how 
confirmation bias, moral panics, and technological determinism can distort 
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